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Abstract 
Tax expenditures are widely used by French governments as em-
ployment and social policies. Such programmes together amounted 
to more than 1.3 points of GDP in 2011. Thanks to a systematic re-
view of academic policy evaluations, we assess the efficiency of the 
different parts of such policies, showing that at least €6 billion is 
used for policies whose cost is greater than €62,500 per year and job 
created, and €0.5 billion for policies whose cost is greater than 
€160,000 per year and job created. We examine the replacement of 
these tax expenditures by direct public funding for (publicly or pri-
vately delivered) ―quality‖ jobs addressing specific social needs. We 
discuss the conditions under which at least comparable employment 
performances could be achieved (factoring in the crowding out of 
privately funded jobs and the properties of created jobs in terms of 
the service provided or the characteristics of suppliers and consum-
ers) as well as any positive economic and social externalities.  
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Introduction 
 
The European strategy in the fight against unemployment has for a 
long time been to reduce labour costs. This is particularly true for 
France, where policies aimed at lowering labour costs through tax 
expenditures (especially exemption from payroll taxes) have been 
widely used since the early 1990s. Such programmes together 
amounted to more than 1.3 points of GDP in 2011. This article aims 
to analyse this strategy and evaluate the impact of a shift from the 
less efficient of these tax cuts to ―social investment‖ services. By 
social investment policies, we mean policies that invest in cognitive 
and non-cognitive skills development (early childhood education and 
care, education and life-long training), policies that help make effi-
cient use of human capital (through policies supporting the employ-
ment of women and lone parents, through active labour market poli-
cies, but also through specific forms of labour market regulation and 
social protection institutions that promote flexible security), while 
fostering greater social inclusion (notably by facilitating access to the 
labour market for groups that have traditionally been excluded) (Mo-
rel et al. 2012). In this paper, we consider social investment services 
to be quality childcare jobs and quality care jobs for frail elderly, 
financed publicly or privately, or provided publicly since these two 
kinds of care jobs allow for family members of the cared person 
(mostly women) to enter or stay in the labour market, since quality 
early childcare and education services are key to developing cogni-
tive and non-cognitive skills, and since quality care jobs are inclusive 
for those who hold them.  
Due to the multidimensional characteristics of employment policies 
(reduction in unemployment, quality of output/jobs, labour market 
dualisation, in-work evolution of employees, etc.), we adopt a ―Pare-
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to-improving‖ approach. Considering social investment whose quali-
tative properties are greater than the present low-skill and low-wage 
jobs created by tax expenditures aimed at lowering labour costs, the 
focus is placed on the quantitative creation of jobs. We analyse the 
conditions under which the replacement of the less efficient of these 
tax expenditures by direct public funding for ―quality‖ jobs (publicly 
or privately delivered) addressing specific social needs would 
achieve at least comparable employment outcomes. 
The use of tax expenditure as a substitute or complement to tradi-
tional welfare state programmes has received a great amount of at-
tention as regards the US case (e.g. Howard 1997, Hacker 2002). 
While the hidden welfare state is smaller than in the US, it is far 
from negligible in some European democracies such as France and 
Germany (Adema et al. 2011). In France, there were more than 80 
different tax expenditure schemes related to social protection (either 
modifying social protection funding or using tax expenditure for so-
cial protection purposes) in 2011.
1
  
We know from the literature (mostly but not solely on the US case), 
that the use of tax expenditures for employment and social purposes 
has several major drawbacks both on the labour market and in terms 
of social policy. On the labour market, tax expenditures targeting 
low-wage jobs are highly suspected of promoting labour market du-
alisation by promoting low-wage and low-quality jobs (Palier and 
Thelen 2010, Gautié and Schmitt 2010, Emmenegger et al. 2012). In 
                                                 
1
 The budgetary loss associated with these tax expenditures amounted to €79 bil-
lion, compared with €673 billion of direct gross public social expenditure: €42 
billion by renouncing earmarked social contributions and €37 billon in ―tax breaks 
for social purposes‖ according to the OECD terminology (Adema et al. 2011). 
These estimates are expressed in initial revenue loss and are reproduced from 
Zemmour (2013). 
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Europe, this is especially the case in care activities (Devetter and 
Jany-Catrice 2010, Morel 2012, Bailly et al. 2013), which affects the 
quality of services delivered (Simonazzi 2009). In terms of social 
policy, tax expenditures used to subsidise private social services 
(care, health insurance, etc.) are suspected of exacerbating the une-
qual provision of social services, fostering risk selection by insurance 
providers and having significant windfall effects (Hacker 2002, 
Howard 1997).  
However, the reason for the massive use of tax expenditure pro-
grammes in France has been their ability to foster job creation in the 
private sector rather than their features in social terms. These pro-
grammes (payroll tax cuts and tax subsidies for households employ-
ing providers of personal services), among other things, are aimed at 
offsetting the relatively high level of the French minimum wage by 
reducing the cost of labour at the minimum wage and immediately 
above. In spite of their poor performances in terms of social out-
comes and job quality, tax expenditures have become one of the cor-
nerstones of the French strategy to reduce unemployment. Similar 
strategies have been identified in several other European countries.
2
 
Much academic work has been done to review this policy. The rela-
tively consensual diagnosis is that it is costly and only moderately 
efficient, but that it has a globally positive employment outcome. 
Thus, abandoning these tax expenditures is not seen as a viable polit-
ical option since it would raise unemployment, compounding the 
prevailing situation of mass unemployment. Our work discusses the 
                                                 
2
 Morel (forthcoming) analyses the impact of the European Commission recom-
mendations for the development of such policies across Europe. For evaluations of 
such schemes in Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and Sweden, see 
Carbonnier and Morel (forthcoming). 
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potentiality of an alternative strategy: we analyse the risks and bene-
fits of switching (partly or totally) from a tax expenditure strategy to 
a social investment strategy, based on the direct and full public fund-
ing of the public or private provision of social investment services 
(primarily childcare and elderly care services). 
Usually, academic evaluations of public policies are aimed at inves-
tigating how efficient a public policy is in achieving its explicit goals 
(including the side effects of the policy). In our approach, we adopt 
the same evaluative perspective in a more comprehensive approach. 
Our idea is not solely to compare the cost and the outcome of the 
evaluated policy (number of jobs created for a given level of payroll 
tax and income tax exemptions), but to determine whether an alterna-
tive use of public expenditure would do better in achieving the same 
goals. In our case, the explicit purpose of the evaluated programmes 
is to stimulate job creation and, partly, to address the need for quality 
social services (care activities). We thus analyse the conditions under 
which direct public funding of jobs in social services (which are as-
sumed to have positive social externalities) could outperform the 
current tax expenditures programmes in respect of these goals (espe-
cially employment). 
Among the numerous and diverse tax expenditures related to em-
ployment and social protection, we chose to focus on two tax ex-
penditure programmes: the ―general exemption‖ of employers’ con-
tributions targeted at low wages, and the tax expenditures officially 
labelled as part of the public policy aimed at promoting ―personal 
service jobs‖. This focus was chosen first because these two pro-
grammes represent two paradigmatic examples of the French em-
ployment strategy over the last three decades. The second reason is 
that these policies have been among the most analysed and evaluated 
LIEPP Working Paper n° 31 
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French tax expenditures; we are thus able to build our reasoning on a 
set of realistic and careful assumptions based on the literature. 
Two kinds of analyses are available. The first is provided by micro-
simulations based on calibrated models, which give an overview of 
the impact of the policies. However, they rely on strong assumptions 
in the models. The second stems from natural experiment evalua-
tions, which provide more robust but also more local results. These 
results are valid only for a part of the targeted population or a part of 
the policy. Nevertheless, the comparison of several such natural ex-
periments allows us to achieve a comprehensive understanding of the 
policy’s impacts. Hence, thanks to the meta-analyses of all these 
evaluations, we are able to consider not only the impact of a full re-
moval of the policies, but also of marginal changes such as the partial 
removal and decreases of ceilings or subsidy rates. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 pre-
sents the argument and the reasoning, section 3 presents the tax ex-
penditure programmes that we intend to analyse; section 4 assesses a 
comprehensive understanding of these policies thanks to the meta-
analysis of the main results of existing academic evaluations of these 
programmes; section 5 exposes the conditions under which these tax 
expenditures could be replaced by publicly funded social services 
without increasing unemployment; and section 6 concludes.  
Our results could be summarised as follows: given the decreasing 
marginal efficiency of tax expenditures in terms of job creation, there 
is a tipping point from which it would be preferable to replace tax 
expenditures by publicly funded social services, from a pure em-
ployment point of view. We find that current exemption programmes 
have overreached this tipping point. Under very conservative as-
2014/07 
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sumptions, we compute that it is possible to transfer at least €6 bil-
lion (out of €27 billion) from tax expenditure to social investment 
programmes with a positive outcome in terms of employment, not to 
mention other positive externalities.  
 
2. Evaluating the opportunity cost of tax expenditures 
We argue that the concept of opportunity cost should be applied to 
the use of public resources, and in this instance to tax expenditure 
programmes. Some would consider it sufficient, to keep a public 
programme running (in the present case, a tax expenditure), to know 
for certain that the programme in question is a source of improve-
ment. However, this is incomplete reasoning: it might be the case 
that maintaining programme P is better than terminating it, yet it 
might also be the case that another programme P’ could do even bet-
ter. In the latter case, P should be replaced by P’. First because effi-
ciency requires the optimal use of available resources; second be-
cause in present times, states face not only budgetary constraints (the 
necessity to balance resources – e.g. taxes plus borrowings – with 
expenditures, including financial costs), but credit constraints as 
well. Hence, if both programmes P and P’ cannot be implemented 
together, the benefits of programme P’ should be considered as the 
opportunity cost of programme P. 
Indeed some public investment expenditures, considered socially 
necessary and even economically profitable in the long run, are not 
realised due to the lack of sufficient funds available. The uncertainty 
in the financial markets and the current level of public debt and defi-
cit in regard to the European Growth and Stability Pact criteria may 
prevent governments from going ahead with these investments, even 
LIEPP Working Paper n° 31 
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if their expected return more than offsets their cost (including finan-
cial costs). This is typically the case of social investments (Vanden-
brouke et al. 2011, Morel et al. 2012): there is now a political con-
sensus that public expenditures in childcare, education, higher educa-
tion, training, or work-life balance policies should simultaneously be 
economically efficient (especially through their capacity to increase 
employment rates, and, in the longer run, to increase the human capi-
tal of the population), prevent social inequalities and address social 
needs. In addition, in most of countries, the public sector already has 
the technology and skills to manage this type of programme: in 
France, for instance, a small part of jobs in childcare or elderly care 
activities are currently entirely publicly funded (through public ser-
vices, or by fully financing private structures or associations). How-
ever, in many countries including France, a large share of the neces-
sary investments is postponed for financial reasons. In France this is 
the case, for instance, for childcare (the government acknowledges a 
need for additional places, evaluated at between 350,000 and 
500,000
3
). That is also why some advocate excluding such pro-
grammes from the Maastricht criteria constraint
4
 (Vandenbrouke et 
al. 2011).  
Yet the French government every year spends €27 billion as tax ex-
penditure (tax breaks, social contribution exemptions, etc.
5
), either 
                                                 
3
 ―Petite enfance : il manque près de 500 000 places d'accueil‖, Le Parisien , 16 
February 2013. 
4
 The focus on the structural deficit rather than the total deficit in the TSCG sup-
ports the view that investments in general should be considered apart from other 
public expenditure. 
5
 This amount only includes our two selected programs; smaller programs with 
similar purposes are not included. Here and in the remainder of the paper, figures 
on public tax expenditures are reproduced from public reports reviewed in 
Zemmour (2013). 
2014/07 
8 
solely to foster employment (the general exemption programme) or 
to subsidise private demand for social services that are not publicly 
addressed (the personal services jobs programme). These policies 
share some objectives with the social investment perspective (em-
ployment, addressing social needs). However, the two types of pro-
grammes differ in their overall economic strategy: current policies 
try to make low-skilled jobs compatible with a high minimum wage 
by lowering the cost of labour; doing this, they also subsidise the 
development of sectors characterised by low productivity and low-
quality jobs, in which France has no comparative advantage. Con-
versely, the hope underpinning a social investment strategy is that 
high labour costs may become sustainable provided that the quality 
of goods and services produced thanks to this strategy
6
 and average 
labour productivity are increased.  
A last question concerns the ability of the government (and indirectly 
the taxpayer) to monitor the use of public funds. In the case of tax 
expenditure, there is no way to control the actual distribution of aid 
(the wealthiest people in fact benefit disproportionally from tax cred-
it programmes (Carbonnier forthcoming)), the quality of services and 
the quality of jobs created. Public financing of social services (be 
they publicly or privately provided) may address these concerns. 
The purpose of this paper is not to analyse or promote the virtues or 
positive externalities that one may expect from a social investment 
strategy (interested readers may refer to Esping-Andersen 2009 or 
Morel et al. 2012 among many others). Given the fact that one of the 
main identified obstacles in the implementation of this strategy is 
                                                 
6
 Nelson and Stephens (2012) demonstrate that social investment policies are cor-
related with the development of high-quality, highly productive and highly paid 
jobs. 
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states’ budgetary context, our research question is: what is the oppor-
tunity cost of maintaining tax expenditure policies?  
Put differently, we try to determine the conditions under which the 
partial or total termination of tax expenditures related to social policy 
to finance publicly delivered jobs in the social investment service 
sector will be at least neutral in terms of employment.  
Importantly, we focus on the immediate employment effect of our 
alternative policy; indeed, we consider that in times of high unem-
ployment, it would not be politically feasible to give up an existing 
policy with a positive employment effect in favour of another with an 
expected benefit in a hypothetical long term. Conversely, since em-
ployment policy is the main purpose of existing tax expenditures, if 
switching these tax expenditures to social investment does not de-
stroy jobs in the short run, we have good reason to think that other 
positive externalities associated with social investment are sufficient 
to make them preferable.  
However, a rigorous economic reasoning cannot rely solely on cost 
comparison. Indeed the efficiency of tax expenditures may be highly 
nonlinear (that of the first and the last euro dedicated to the tax ex-
penditure may be very different). We must thus determine locally the 
area of (in)efficiency of different measures. By contrast, the public 
financing of a service will probably crowd out certain privately fi-
nanced jobs. This is also taken into consideration in our general rea-
soning and calculation. 
Using a meta-analysis of the evaluative academic literature and the 
tools of public economy, we propose a systematic reasoning with a 
marginal approach to determine the conditions under which part of 
tax expenditures could be outperformed by a specific type of public 
2014/07 
10 
provision of social investment services. More specifically we take 
into account both the windfall effect of existing tax expenditures and 
the potential windfall effect of publicly funded social services. 
 
3. Presentation of the two tax expenditure programmes 
In France, there are currently 460 different types of tax expenditures 
(including 80 that are linked to social protection), plus 50 social con-
tribution breaks and exemptions. However, for the sake of simplicity, 
we will focus here on the two main tax expenditure programmes 
aimed at fighting unemployment: general social contribution exemp-
tions, and tax expenditures on jobs in personal services. 
3.1. Social contribution exemptions 
This policy implemented incrementally between 1993 and 2007 and 
still in force (See Palier 2005 chapter 6 and Zemmour 2012 chapter 1 
for details) consists in payroll tax cuts targeted on low-wages. The 
tax cuts solely concern employer ―social contributions‖ (payroll tax) 
paid to la sécurité sociale (social insurance funds for sickness, inva-
lidity, old age pensions and family benefits). Exemptions are a de-
gressive function of the gross wage; they apply to employees of pri-
vate firms (household employees are excluded) between 1 and 1.6 
times the minimum wage. Fifty percent of the labour force is con-
cerned by payroll tax cuts to some extent in France. 
In 2014, the maximum exemption (at the minimum wage level) 
amounts roughly to €4,500 per year (€4,700 for small firms), putting 
the labour cost at the minimum wage level at €20,200 (as opposed to 
€24,700). Due to this exemption policy, payroll taxes and social con-
tributions (the tax wedge) constitute only 34% of the labour cost at 
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the minimum wage, compared with 46% without exemptions. Put 
differently, the state actually bears about 18% of the labour cost at 
the minimum wage level. 
It is worth noting in passing that this exemption from social security 
contributions is not associated with reduced benefit entitlements for 
the employees concerned. As a counterpart, the state is legally com-
mitted to compensate social security funds, paying the total amount 
of the exempted contributions out of its budget (in practice, the com-
pensation is closer to 90% than 100%). Thus, the policy is not a mere 
tax cut, but rather a tax transfer from payroll taxes to the govern-
ment’s general tax revenue (taxes other than payroll taxes, such as 
income tax or VAT). This is probably why this policy has attracted 
so much attention in academic and official circles, whereas ordinary 
tax expenditures are often under-considered. In 2011, the amount of 
this ―general exemption‖ was €20 billion (1 point of GDP). 
Another tax cut was added in 2013 and is poised to grow in 2014: the 
competitiveness and employment tax credit (Crédit d’impôt compéti-
tivité et emploi – CICE). It was approved by Parliament as a corpo-
rate tax credit of 6% of the gross wages of employees paid less than 
2.5 times the minimum wage. It acts as social security contribution 
exemption, with the difference that it is de facto exempted from cor-
porate tax, so it is equivalent to a social contribution exemption 
amounting to between €25 billion and €30 billion. Negotiations are 
currently underway to transform it into a €30 billion social contribu-
tion exemption. In contrast to other exemptions, it is far less targeted 
on low wages. For the sake of simplicity and in absence of any ex-
post evaluation, we exclude the CICE from the scope of this paper. 
2014/07 
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Nevertheless, it is highly important to keep in mind that the amount 
of public expenditure that could potentially be shifted from tax cuts 
to social investment may be far greater than those presented here, 
which are assessed on the most conservative basis. 
3.2. Tax expenditures on personal service jobs  
The French ―personal service jobs‖ sector includes gardening, house-
cleaning, as well as childcare, elderly care or care for disabled adults. 
Hence, it does not have a functional or economic consistence: it 
combines all kinds of services, delivered by household employees, 
associations and firms directly in the home (Carbonnier 2009, Devet-
ter and Jany-Catrice 2010, Morel 2012 and Carbonnier and Morel 
forthcoming). The sector’s unity is institutional: these activities are 
officially labelled as “services à la personne” (personal service jobs) 
and are eligible for a string of specific tax expenditures. Certain tax 
expenditures are targeted solely at personal service jobs for ―fragile‖ 
people (children under 6, frail elderly persons), whereas others are 
only conditional on hiring an employee in the household. Table 1 
summarises the different tax expenditures targeted on personal ser-
vices jobs. 
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Table 1: Tax expenditures targeted at personal service jobs 
Tax or social contribu-
tion concerned 
Type of tax 
expenditure Measure 
Initial revenue 
loss in 2011 
(billion euros) 
Personal income tax Tax reduction  Tax reduction for personal services at 
home (including child care), if inactivity 
in the household 
1.3 
Personal income tax Tax credit Tax credit for personal services at home 
(including childcare), if active single or 
bi-active couple  
1.7 
Employer contributions Contribution 
reduction 
Employer contribution reduction targeted 
at personal service jobs 
2 
VAT Exemption and 
reduced rate 
VAT exemption or reduction on personal 
services provided at home by firms or 
associations  
0.9 
  TOTAL Personal service jobs 5,9 
LIEPP Working Paper n° 31 
15 
  Share dedicated to social services (higher 
bound, Zemmour 2013) 
3,6 
    
  Other tax expenditures with a similar 
function 
 
Personal income tax Tax reduction Tax reduction for childcare (out of home) 0.9 
Personal income tax Reduced rate Reduced taxation for certified child care-
givers 
0.1 
    
  TOTAL 6.9 
2014/07 
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The biggest tax expenditures targeted on personal service jobs are the 
personal income tax credit and the personal income tax reduction.
7
 
Together, they amounted to €3 billion in 2011.8 In this field, social 
contribution exemptions are also substantial (€1 billion in 2011); 
some apply to all types of jobs, others are targeted on certain caring 
activities. In a way, these exemptions mirror the general exemptions 
on low wages, to which personal services jobs provided at home for 
individual employers (households) are not eligible. Unlike the ―gen-
eral exemptions‖, these targeted exemptions are not compensated by 
the state to la sécurité sociale. 
Together, tax expenditures dedicated to personal services jobs 
amounted to €5.9 billion in 2011. A substantial share of them is de-
voted to care activities, but the estimate according to which 60% are 
dedicated jobs with a social purpose
9
 (mainly care activities) is un-
doubtedly an exaggeration. 
Some of the tax expenditures reported in Table 1 are delivered out-
side beneficiaries’ households, but they are very similar: they mostly 
concern childcare expenditures, and together amount to €1 billion. 
  
                                                 
7
 The credit is refundable, whereas the reduction is not. The credit is restricted 
solely to bi-active households (or active singles), whereas the reduction is open to 
households including inactive people. From this, Devetter and Jany-Catrice (2010) 
infer that the reduction may subsidise caring activities for the elderly, whereas the 
credit mostly funds ―convenience‖ services, and residually childcare (Zemmour, 
2013). However, statistics show that a large proportion of the tax reduction bene-
fited robust young mono-active couples without children under 6. 
8
 Amounts are expressed in ―initial revenue loss‖, see OECD (2010) for a defini-
tion. Data are from French official reports and are collated in Zemmour (2013). 
9
 Updated computation from Devetter and Jany-Catrice (2010), see appendices of 
Zemmour (2013) for details. 
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4. Existing evaluations of these tax expenditures 
4.1. Evaluation of the general exemption policy 
This policy has always been understood as an employment policy. As 
such, the main question addressed by evaluations has been to deter-
mine the policy’s efficiency in terms of job creation/preservation. 
According to the general consensus, exemptions targeted on low 
wages do foster the creation of low-wage jobs, but the marginal effi-
ciency of targeted exemption decreases with the wage level (an ex-
tensive review can be found in Rémy 2006 and Bunel et al. 2012).  
This is due first to the difference in bargaining power amongst work-
ers: the higher the bargaining power of employees, the higher the 
share of exemptions that will eventually be translated into net wage 
rises, instead of labour cost reductions. Gruber (1994), Anderson and 
Meyer (1997, 2000) as well as Murphy (2007) show through natural 
experiments in the United States that the higher the wage, the lower 
the share of the payroll tax exemption benefiting the employer in 
decreases in labour costs. By definition, workers paid at the mini-
mum wage have virtually no bargaining power (to put it differently, 
they are paid more than the wage they would be able to obtain in a 
bargaining process) (Malinvaud, 1998), so it is plausible that even if 
employers’ contributions are reduced, they will not be able to negoti-
ate a pay rise, thereby resulting in job creations. Conversely, em-
ployees paid above the minimum wage have non-zero bargaining 
power; consequently, they are able to prevent their employer from 
pocketing the entire amount of any contribution exemption; it is fair 
to assume then that any contribution exemption will translate partly 
into a net wage increase, and partly into a reduction in the cost of 
labour. And this reduction in the cost of labour will probably be low-
2014/07 
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er for workers on higher wages, who are assumed to have higher bar-
gaining power.  
The second reason is that the labour cost elasticity of labour demand 
is higher for low-skilled jobs (Hammermesh 1996); put differently, 
employers’ hiring behaviour is more sensitive to labour costs for 
low-skilled jobs. Thus, the same amount of exemption entails a 
stronger increase in demand for labour when targeted on low-skilled 
jobs (i.e. low wages). 
If it is consensual that the impact of payroll tax cuts on employment 
is greater for low wages than for high wages, the actual level of these 
impacts remains non-consensual. Several robust estimates of this 
elasticity exist, mainly in the Nordic countries. None found any sig-
nificant impact from payroll taxes on employment. For some, this 
may be due to the fact that the reduction in payroll tax examined was 
not targeted on low wages: Bohm and Lind (1993) and Bennmarker 
et al. (2009) for Sweden, and Korkeamäki and Uusitalo (2009) for 
Finland set regional difference-in-difference estimates (taking ad-
vantage of regional payroll tax reforms), and found no effect on em-
ployment. However, Huttunen et al. (2013) use difference-in-
difference methodology (per age categories) to assess the impact of a 
Finnish payroll tax cut targeting older workers on low wages: they 
found no impact at the extensive margins and a small impact at the 
intensive margins. 
Estimates for the French case mainly simulate the impact of a payroll 
tax cut based on assumptions (and not estimates) of this elasticity. 
The hypotheses assume far stronger elasticity of employment to pay-
roll tax cuts than estimated in other countries. Even if international 
comparisons shed doubt on French micro-simulations (they probably 
LIEPP Working Paper n° 31 
19 
over-estimate the efficiency of these social contribution exemp-
tions
10
) we have kept these results for our exercise. Taking these 
over-estimated results ensures that the shift to social investment is in 
fact even more profitable than what we present here. 
These estimates allow us to compute a ―cost per job created‖. Empir-
ical measurement summarised in Bunel et al. (2012) suggests that the 
cost (in terms of tax expenditure) per job created is comprised be-
tween €10,000 and €70,000, with an average of €24,000. However 
the measured cost has changed in recent studies, partly because of 
methodological issues, partly because these studies focused on the 
last wave of exemptions, targeted on relatively higher wages (be-
tween 1.3 and 1.6 times the minimum wage), which are probably less 
efficient. Among the seven studies published since 2004 and re-
viewed by Bunel et al. (2012), only one puts the value below 
€24,000, while the other six present point estimates higher than 
€38,000 per job. In their study, Bunel et al. (2012) conclude that the 
cost per directly created job is comprised between €39,000 and 
€48,000.  
For the remainder of the present work, we consider as a reference the 
work of Bunel et al. (2012), which presents the advantage of being 
consistent with the most recent estimates. Moreover, the focus of this 
study was to examine the effects of a partial termination of exemp-
tions under different scenarios. Bunel et al. (2012) compute the direct 
job destruction expectable if exemptions are reduced by 25% (€5 
billion). Unsurprisingly, they find that the result strongly depends on 
the design of the exemption reduction: a reduction of €5 billion, 
among all exemptions across the board, could destroy up to 166,000 
                                                 
10
 The periods of expansion of exemptions (1993-2000 and 2005-2007) are also 
periods of deficit reduction or stagnation. 
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jobs, whereas it would destroy much fewer jobs if the €5 billion re-
duction only concerned higher wages. Bunel et al. calculate that if 
the exemptions were targeted only on jobs paid between 1 and 1.35 
times the minimum wage, the reduction would destroy less than half 
the number of jobs: fewer than 80 000 jobs.
11
 
According to this result, the marginal cost of job creation through 
exemptions (for exemptions close to the median wage) is €62,50012 
(which is more than twice the total labour cost for a decent job
13
). 
Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that, according to the 
comparison of the French evaluation hypotheses with the actual for-
eign estimates, this figure is undoubtedly a lower bound of the actual 
cost per job created of such measures.  
  
                                                 
11
 Bunel et al. (2012) add that the marginal cost of job creation through exemption 
is probably much higher in labour-intensive sectors (28% of the labour force): for 
these specific jobs, the same redesigning of exemptions (exclusion of jobs above 
1.35 times the minimum wage) would generate a marginal gain of up to €210,000 
per job destroyed. Considering the labour force ratio in such labour-intensive sec-
tors and the evaluation of the removal of the contribution exemption above 1.35 
times the minimum wage, we calculate that this termination would allow a public 
saving of €1.4 billion. 
12
 This corresponds to a cut of €5 billion to exemptions through the redesigning of 
exemptions, excluding jobs above 1.35 times the minimum wage, and slightly 
reinforcing the exemption targeting the lowest wages. The author computes that 
this reform would destroy fewer than 80,000 jobs; this corresponds to a gain of 
€62,500 per job (see pp. 89-92 of Bunel et al. 2012). 
13
 Details to be found in section 5. 
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4.2. Evaluations of tax expenditures dedicated to personal service 
jobs 
The personal service job sector has been far less evaluated in terms 
of job creation than the exemption policy. The major part of subsi-
dies is provided through the income tax reduction/credit for house-
hold service consumption. It consists in the reimbursement through a 
tax rebate of 50% of expenses under the annual ceiling.
14
 Evaluations 
have been made using different natural experiments: when the tax 
reduction was first set in 1992 (Marbot 2013); when the ceiling was 
cut in 1998 (Garbinti 2011); when it has increased again in 2003 
(Carbonnier 2009); and when the tax reduction was turned into a tax 
credit for active households, thereby making the poorest households, 
who do not pay income tax, eligible (Marbot and Roy 2011). 
These studies allow us to capture not the overall, but the marginal 
effect of this tax credit for different groups of beneficiaries. Carbon-
nier (forthcoming) presents a meta-analysis of these estimates, with 
recalculations of the estimate derived from unlikely assumptions. He 
also takes inflation into account to obtain comparable values of the 
public cost per job created. It appears that the initial setting of the tax 
reduction in 1992 with a ceiling of €3,800 euros per year created 
27,556 equivalent full time jobs at a cost of €39,113 per job created. 
The 1998 reduction in the ceiling from €13,720 to €6,860 destroyed 
613 jobs with a saving of €228,222 per job destroyed. The 2003 in-
crease in the ceiling from €6,900 to €10,000 created 553 jobs at a 
cost of €159,494 per job created. The 2007 shift from tax reduction 
                                                 
14
 This ceiling is the maximum amount of household’s expenditure eligible for a 
tax credit/reduction. The ceiling was first set at €3,800, increased to €13,720 in 
1995, cut to €6,900 in 1998, increased to €10,000 in 2003 and is now set at 
€12,000 plus €1,500 per dependent child or elderly person. 
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to tax credit for active households created 1,727 jobs at a cost of 
€77,360 per job created (Carbonnier forthcoming). 
Thanks to interpolations, and a re-evaluation according to inflation of 
total spending and values of the present ceiling, it is possible to as-
sess the saving in terms of tax expenditure that would be achieved by 
different reforms of the income tax reduction/credit for household 
service consumption. Cutting the ceiling back to €7,000 euros per 
year would save €0.5 billion, or more than €160,000 per job de-
stroyed. Cutting it to €5,000 per year and returning to the tax reduc-
tion (as opposed to a tax credit) would save €1 billion, or €77,000 per 
job destroyed. Table 2 gathers the information on savings and job 
destruction of possible reforms of general social contribution reduc-
tions and income tax reductions for household service consumption. 
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Table 2: Marginal cost per created jobs and volume of tax expenditure 
Limitation of tax expenditures Marginal cost per created job Volume 
General exemption above 1.35 times the 
minimum wage solely in labour-intensive 
sectors 
€210,000 €1.4 billion 
Income tax cuts for personal services above 
€6,900 per year 
€160,000 €0.5 billion 
Income tax cuts for personal services above 
€5,000 and tax credit 
€77,000 €1 billion 
General exemptions above 1.35 times the 
minimum wage (all sectors) 
€62,500 €5 billion 
Income tax cuts for personal services above 
€5,000, tax credit and general exemptions 
above 1.35 times the minimum wage (all 
sectors) 
€62,500 €6 billion 
CICE Probably far more than €62,500 €20 billion 
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If we combine the sums devoted to the general programme of payroll 
tax exemptions and the tax cuts dedicated to personal services, tax 
expenditures dedicated to subsidising low-wage jobs amounted to 
€27 billion in 201415 (Zemmour 2013). Based on the most conserva-
tive hypotheses mentioned above, we can assume that at least €6 
billion of this has a marginal utility in terms of direct job creation of 
less than €62,500 per job created: €5 billion from exemptions, €1 
billion from personal service jobs. Smaller reductions in tax expendi-
ture would generate funds at far lower costs in terms of job destroyed 
per euro saved. 
 
5. Creating decent jobs on public funds 
Existing evaluations of the job creation effects of payroll tax cuts and 
income tax credits and reductions are purely quantitative. However, 
we also know that many of these jobs are of poor quality: part time, 
no access to training and upward professional mobility, weaker so-
cial protection etc. (Gautié and Schmitt 2010, Emmenegger et al. 
2012). This is especially the case for care jobs (Bailly et al. 2013, 
Morel 2012). 
In the previous section, we stressed that some of the expenditures 
aimed at supporting the development of these jobs may have low 
marginal efficiency. In the following section, we ask whether part of 
the money devoted (through tax expenditure) to the support of these 
jobs could be used for the direct creation of entirely publicly funded 
(public or private) jobs of higher quality. We have established with 
certainty that at least €6 billion is spent with a marginal effect of less 
                                                 
15
 The CICE and general exemptions amount to €20 billion. Tax expenditure on 
personal service jobs amount to €7 billion. 
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than one job created for €62,500 spent. We analyse below the condi-
tions under which the creation of decent publicly funded jobs would 
have a better effect on employment. 
We thus compute the cost of a decent job, and determine the em-
ployment effect of the public financing of such a job in the social 
service sector. We take into account the fact that this public funding 
may have windfall effects through the eviction of privately funded 
jobs. Before assessing the eviction rate, we evaluate the total public 
cost of publicly funding a decent job. 
5.1. What is the cost of a decent job? 
The notion of job quality is complex and does not depend solely on 
the wage. The interested reader may refer to several works on this 
topic (e.g. Clark 2005 and Davoine et al. 2008; see Dahl et al. 2009 
for an extensive review). For what follows, we intend to determine 
the possible accounting cost of a decent job for low-skilled workers. 
As amply demonstrated, low-skilled workers are nowadays most 
likely to be unemployed, or to occupy atypical jobs (Emmenegger et 
al. 2012); they are primarily targeted by the programmes under focus 
above. We consider a typical decent job to be a full-time job, paid at 
the minimum wage, with a thirteenth month (which is a standard for 
core workers of the private sector in France), providing entitlements 
to paid training leave (which is necessary to have the prospect of 
upward mobility) and complete access to social protection (including 
complementary health insurance). We also consider overhead costs 
(a manager paid twice the minimum wage for 20 workers); we ne-
glect the cost of fixed capital, which is low in the social service sec-
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tor. The direct cost of such a job is thus estimated at slightly below 
€30,00016 per year (in 2013). 
This labour cost corresponds to a net annual wage (before personal 
income tax) of €14,500. The difference between the net wage and the 
labour cost may appear high, but 40% of the cost (€12,500) consists 
of payroll tax and complementary health insurance. The remainder is 
overhead costs. 
5.2. Job creation, job eviction, and the net employment effect 
The public financing of X jobs does not necessarily generate a net job 
creation of X. Indeed, public job creation is likely to crowd out some 
privately funded jobs that would have existed otherwise. There are 
thus intermediate steps to go from the number of publicly financed 
jobs to the net employment effect of this policy. 
On the one hand, the French state every year spends at least €6 bil-
lion to subsidise low-quality jobs, at a price higher than €62,500 per 
job created. The corresponding number of created jobs is thus inferi-
or to 96,000.
17
 On the other hand, the total cost of a job at this wage 
level – including management costs and full-rate social security con-
tributions – does not exceed €30,000. With a budget of 6€ billion, 
200,000 jobs can thus be publicly funded (these jobs may be either 
                                                 
16
 The minimum gross wage is €17,330, the 13th month is an extra €1,445 and 
employer contributions (including training leave) amount to €7,886. The employer 
contribution to complementary health insurance is estimated at €400. An additional 
manager for each 20 people employed, paid twice this wage (including the 13th 
month, etc.) adds a cost of €2,700 per person employed. The total annual cost per 
job is €29,731. 
17
 It is actually far less, since the rate of €62,500 per job destroyed is the marginal 
cost for the last of the €6 billion and the previous euros may be saved at a far lower 
cost in terms of job destruction (see table 2). 
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public or private, but in any case deliver a service paid for directly by 
the state
18
). 
However, we cannot infer from these two statements alone that it is 
preferable to cancel exemptions and replace them with publicly 
funded jobs. The ―windfall effect‖ that applies to tax expenditure has 
a flipside when jobs are publicly funded: public job creation may 
crowd out some privately funded jobs that would have existed in 
absence of the policy. Consequently, the net effect of a policy of 
provision of public jobs is the difference between the jobs publicly 
funded and the number of jobs privately funded liable to disappear 
because of the windfall effect. The reasoning may be briefly formal-
ised as follows: 
D is the public expenditure dedicated to the provision of new social 
services (through job creation); 
T is the number of privately funded jobs that would have existed 
without the public provision of social services and that would disap-
pear due to the public provision (T
19
 is the size of the windfall effect 
expressed in terms of jobs); 
R is the unit cost of a publicly funded job (€30 000); 
C is the marginal unit cost of jobs subsidised through tax expendi-
tures. 
The direct job creation through D is thus not N1=D/R but N2=D/R-T. 
If the public provision of social services is funded through the can-
                                                 
18
 Such a scheme is already in force for frail elderly people in France. 
19
 T is in fact a growing function of D. 
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cellation of tax expenditures, the net job creation is not N1–N0=D/R-
D/C but only N2-N0=D/R-D/C-T=D(C-R)/(RC)-T. 
Let z be the share of jobs that are not created by public provision but 
actually transferred from the private to the public sector z=T/(D/R). z 
is the eviction rate of private jobs due to the public provision of so-
cial services. Here, the shift creates jobs if N2-N0>0, that is if 1-
R/C>z. Together z – the eviction rate – and the C/R ratio – the cost of 
tax expenditure per job created as a proportion of the cost of a decent 
job – delimit the cases where it is preferable to cut tax expenditures 
and to prefer public provision or not (Figure 1), from a purely quanti-
tative perspective. 
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Figure 1. Tax incentive versus public funding 
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Notes: GELI stands for removing general exemption above 1.35 
times the minimum wage solely in labour-intensive sectors; GE 
stands for removing of all the general exemption above 1.35 times 
the minimum wage; PSR1 stands decreasing ceiling of the income 
tax cut for household services down to €7,000 per year; PSR2 stands 
for removing the possibility of a tax credit and reducing the ceiling 
of income tax cuts for household services above €5,000. 
Reading: The grey area corresponds to the cases where the public 
funding of jobs is preferable to tax expenditure schemes from a pure-
ly quantitative employment perspective. For instance, if the C/R ratio 
is 7 (which is the case for the social contribution above 1.35 times 
the minimum wage in the labour-intensive sectors), direct public 
funding is preferable as long as the eviction rate z is lower than 
85.7%, that is as long as public funding of 100 jobs destroyed is 
strictly less than 86 privately funded jobs. 
 
This form of (marginal) reasoning allows us to plan a marginal im-
plementation of the policy. For instance, if the marginal cost paid per 
created job C is really high (for instance €160,000 per job or C/R=5.3 
as for the income tax reduction for household services above €7,000 
per year), it is almost always preferable to prefer public provision in 
employment terms, even if the eviction rate is high (up to 81%). 
Conversely, when the marginal cost per created job is equal to the 
cost of direct creation or slightly higher (for instance €39,000 or 1.3 
as for the complete removal of the income tax reduction for house-
hold services), public provision is only preferable if the eviction rate 
z is very low (only 23%). 
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If we consider a case with C superior or equal to €62,500 (as it is the 
case for the jobs created by the last €6 billion mentioned in section 4) 
the eviction rate should not be higher than 52% to be sure that the net 
effect on employment is positive. It should be borne in mind that this 
evaluation is based on very conservative assumptions. 
Empirically, the eviction rate z (thus the efficiency of public provi-
sion) depends on the type of social service provided. When the pro-
vision of a social service addresses needs that were previously unsat-
isfied because demanders’ budget constraints were too tight, the 
eviction rate is almost 0. As we noted in section 4.2, this could be 
typically the case of childcare for households with the lowest in-
comes. It could also be the case of appropriate care for frail elderly 
people in relatively low-income families (these services are often 
delivered by relatives since their market price is unaffordable, even 
with fiscal policies). Consequently, the targeting of public services 
on populations whose consumption of social services is rationed (be-
cause of their low income or their high needs) will reinforce efficien-
cy. Moreover, in that specific case, positive externalities are obvious 
at least by allowing caregivers (mostly working-age women) to oc-
cupy a better job. 
Job creations in other social investment sectors (education, public 
health, training, etc.) are also unlikely to crowd out market-provided 
jobs. On the contrary, housekeeping services (except for frail elderly 
people), which are currently subsidised through tax expenditures, are 
typically a sector where public provision (as well as the public subsi-
dising of the private sector) is almost inefficient (except for allowing 
rich people to pay less taxes).  
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5.3. Tax pressure, national accounting and public budget balance 
As stated in the introduction, one of the main obstacles to the imple-
mentation of social investment programmes is the constraint of bal-
ancing the public budget. In the present case, this would not be an 
issue, since the shift from tax expenditure to social investment is 
neutral with regard to the public budget (in fact it apparently raises 
both apparent tax revenue and apparent public expenditure by the 
same amount). 
We examine the reduction of two kinds of tax expenditures. Exemp-
tions of employer social security contributions (€5 billion) and per-
sonal income tax credit/reduction (€1 billion). What are the conse-
quences on the national accounts? 
The earmarking of some tax revenue for social security funds cur-
rently covers employer social contribution exemptions. This trick is 
done by transferring the loss of revenue generated by exemptions to 
the government’s general budget. Consequently, social contribution 
exemptions affect the government’s general budget rather than that 
of the social security fund. Their cancellation will thus raise general 
government revenue by €5 billion. This €5 billion, we argue, could 
be more efficiently spent by funding social service jobs.  
A (big) reduction of personal income tax breaks will entail an in-
crease in tax revenue by the same amount.
20
 This new revenue of €1 
billion, we argue, could be more efficiently spent by financing pub-
licly delivered social service jobs. 
                                                 
20
 The termination of certain types of income tax reductions may be an incentive 
for households to use other forms of tax reductions more intensively. Thus, the 
actual gain from the termination of such personal income tax reductions/credits 
may be slightly smaller than the cost of the tax credit itself. 
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Together, the shift allowing the investment of €6 billion on social 
investment programmes will raise apparent tax pressure by €6 billion 
and apparent public expenditure by €6 billion. Yet this apparent 
change is conventional and attributable to the fact that tax expendi-
ture is recorded as lower tax revenue and not as expenditure: it does 
not reflect a higher level of government intervention, but rather a 
change in the form of government intervention.
21
 More important 
given the institutional constraint at work, this shift is neutral on the 
general budget balance under the Maastricht/Growth and Stability 
Pact definition. 
Additionally, this reform would be neutral on aggregate household 
income, since the lower tax expenditure is exactly compensated by 
the provision of in-kind services of the same value. However, it is 
obviously not necessarily neutral from a distributional point of view 
(the beneficiaries of new social services would not necessarily be the 
same households as those who used to benefit from tax expendi-
tures). More precisely, if publicly funded jobs target the social needs 
of households with constrained budgets, the shift would increase the 
overall redistribution of the French tax and transfer system. 
  
                                                 
21
 Put differently, it would affect France’s ranking according to its gross tax level 
and public expenditure, but would leave its level of net social expenditure (as pro-
posed by Adema et al. 2011) unchanged. 
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6. Conclusion  
Tax expenditures do not just have a budgetary cost. In times when 
public finances are strongly constrained (both by the expected vola-
tility of interest rates on government bonds and by the European trea-
ties), the cost of a relatively inefficient policy is also to crowd out 
other public expenditures that could be more efficient and have posi-
tive social outcomes. 
While the adoption of a social investment perspective depends partly 
on normative views and partisan politics, it seems to us that a bias 
towards the status quo also plays a role in government choices. In-
deed, it is a common view that social investment may have positive 
economic outcomes in the future and that employment-targeted tax 
expenditures are relatively inefficient. But the latter are maintained, 
since their termination would unavoidably increase unemployment in 
the short run, which would be politically unacceptable. 
In this paper, we have studied the conditions under which an alterna-
tive scenario would be viable. We find that switching the budget cur-
rently devoted to the less efficient share of tax expenditures (those 
targeting the highest wages or households with the highest income) 
to the public financing of social services would not have detrimental 
effects for employment in the short run.  
More evaluations would be required on certain tax expenditures to be 
exhaustive. Nevertheless, based on existing literature and on very 
conservative assumptions, we show that at least €6 billion (0.3 points 
of GDP) could be switched from tax expenditure programmes to so-
cial investment programmes. This switch would have a positive em-
ployment effect as long as the eviction of existing jobs is lower than 
52%. This can certainly be achieved if new social programmes are 
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targeted at households with the greatest needs and the lowest in-
comes. 
More generally, we consider that the latter result tends to support the 
view that an incremental move from current economic strategies 
based on the subsidising of low-skill jobs in favour of a ―high quali-
ty‖ path could be both politically and economically sustainable. 
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